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EVEN MORE WRONGFUL DEATH: STATUTES 
DIVORCED FROM REALITY 
John G. Culhane* 
INTRODUCTION 
Conferences convening to discuss matters of legal interest to a particular 
group are important occasions for gathering information, updating an 
audience on relevant developments, and sharing recent experiences.  More 
specifically, the Lavender Law conference that spawned this Article also 
afforded legal academics, judges, and practitioners a chance to speak across 
the fence to neighbors with whom we too often have little contact.  Such 
opportunities are especially enriching for those of us who write and think 
from a more theoretical point of view about the law; we learn of the real-
world effects of our issues, not only for the 
lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgendered (“LGBT”) community but for others 
that the legal regime often discounts.  As someone who has an interest in 
both tort law and the rights of same-sex couples, I find these connections 
particularly helpful. 
I first became interested in wrongful death laws because of their unjust 
effect on surviving members of same-sex couples.  I quickly came to 
realize, however, that these statutes contain deeper flaws that make them 
ill-suited to their task of compensating those who suffer loss from the death 
of their “supporter,” to use the most general term.  Thus, this Article 
criticizes wrongful death laws on both of these levels simultaneously.  In 
short, the statutes fail those in same-sex relationships, as well as many 
others who suffer the kind of losses for which the statutes were meant to 
compensate.  The following preliminary words to ground the discussion of 
wrongful death may be helpful. 
 
* Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law; Lecturer, Yale University School of 
Public Health.  This Article grew out of a presentation at the Lavender Law Conference 
(October 17-19, 2003) at Fordham University School of Law.  The presentation was part of 
a panel entitled “Civil Justice? The Tort System’s Treatment of LGBT Persons.”  Thanks to 
Larry Levine for inviting me to participate on the panel, and to Kenny Levine (no relation) 
for his excellent research assistance. 
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While the law favors actions for personal injury and property damage, 
tort claims based on injuries to relational interests are only grudgingly 
recognized.  For understandable reasons, courts have been reluctant to 
extend recovery to parties beyond the person physically injured, even 
though these second-order harms are real enough.  Thus, for example, 
claims for negligently inflicted emotional distress may be based on 
physical injury to another person, but only under carefully circumscribed 
circumstances.1  Similarly, one who suffers a relational losslabeled a 
“loss of consortium”because of a physical injury to another may have a 
claim against the tortfeasor, though courts have strictly limited these claims 
as well.  Legal spouses are among those most likely to recover for these 
types of claims.2  Children and parents can recover in some states, but not 
in others.3  Little movement has been made towards expanding claims to 
include unmarried couples, including same-sex couples.4  It also follows 
that friends, business associates, and sports teammates are unable to 
recover for their loss of consortium when another suffers personal injury. 
To list these categories of potential plaintiffs is to underscore the reason 
for judicial reluctance in allowing recovery for these relational harms.  To 
permit recovery for injuries to relations would extend the compass of 
liability outward from the primary victim, an expansion which would be 
limited only by the practicalities of litigation: a distant acquaintance would 
likely suffer little loss, and therefore neither she nor her attorney (working 
in a contingency-fee universe) would likely pursue the case.  Nonetheless, 
one can easily imagine a large class of potential plaintiffs in any particular 
 
 1. Typically, the plaintiff must be closely related to the primary victim, and must have 
had a contemporaneous sensory awareness of the injury to that victim.  See, e.g., Thing v. 
La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 820 (Cal. 1989).  Emotional distress claims differ from loss of 
consortium claims in that one might suffer emotional distress from witnessing the injury to a 
complete stranger.  But unless one is fearful for one’s own safety, courts have uniformly 
required a close relationship between the physically injured victim and the emotional 
distress plaintiff.  DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 5.03(2)(g) (2004) (citing Dillon v. Legg, 
441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968)).  Loss of consortium claims, in contrast, are based on the harm to 
the relationship itself.  See, e.g., Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1978). 
 2. For a concise explanation of the evolving justification for loss of spousal consortium 
claims, see DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 841-43 (2001). 
 3. Id. at 842. 
 4. Id.  In Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 379 (N.J. 1994), the New Jersey Supreme 
Court became the first state high court to recognize a claim by an unmarried cohabitant for 
the negligent infliction of emotional distress.  This case no longer stands alone, however.  
See discussion infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.  Even more significantly, the 
New Mexico Supreme Court recently became the first to hold that unmarried intimates 
could even bring loss of consortium claims.  Lozoya v. Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948, 951 (N.M. 
2003).  For a more in-depth discussion of this case, see infra notes 106-08 and 
accompanying text. 
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case involving relational harms, and courts have established bright line 
ramparts to dissuade all but a tight core of closely related persons from 
suing.  There has even been some movement to abolish the consortium tort 
entirely.5 
But if the loss of consortium tort is to be recognized at all, what lines are 
reasonable?  In attempting to fix the outer boundaries of liability, courts 
have sometimes looked to wrongful death laws.  Such laws, passed in every 
state during the nineteenth century,6 establish strict categories of those 
eligible to recover.  As would be expected of laws that pre-date today’s 
evolving definitions and constructions of “family,” the laws generally limit 
recovery to close blood relations, which include the nuclear family, and 
perhaps grandparents and grandchildren, and those related by marriage.7  
As the following discussion shows, these laws have become problematic, 
as they do not reliably tie recovery to real loss. 
Awards in wrongful death actions provide financial assistance to those 
who, because of the death of another at the hands of a party who was 
negligent or worse, have suffered a loss of economic support.  For reasons 
of historical accident,8 wrongful death law is statutory.  The laws in every 
state define the class of eligible beneficiaries.9  In this respect, the statutes 
achieve results similar to those that courts reach in emotional distress and 
loss of consortium cases. 
Elsewhere, I have explored at length the laws of emotional distress and 
loss of consortium as they apply to same-sex relationships.10  I have 
suggested that, despite the statutory impediments, progress on the law of 
wrongful death seems more promising than any evolution of thought on the 
 
 5. The tort was done away with in Britain, the nation of its birth.  Administration of 
Justice Act 1982, ch. 53, § 2 (1982) (Eng.).  New Mexico rejected loss of consortium in the 
1985 case Tondre v. Thurmond-Hollis-Thurmond, Inc., 706 P.2d 156, 157 (N.M. 1985), but 
resurrected it in 1994 in Romero v. Byers, 872 P.2d 840, 844 (N.M. 1994).  New Mexico is 
now arguably the nation’s most progressive state in this area of the law.  See infra Part 
II.B.2 for a discussion of developments in New Mexico. 
 6. Wrongful death statutes were needed to address an anomaly in the common law: 
while personal injury was a compensable event, death was not.  Any tort that the victim 
would have been able to bring was extinguished by the victim’s death (or the death of the 
tortfeasor, for that matter), and the survivors had no independent claim for their own loss 
arising from the death of one who supported them.  See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 803. “There 
has never been any good explanation for all these rules.”  Id. 
 7. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
 8. Legislation was needed because of the intransigence of the common law.  See 
DOBBS, supra note 2, at 803. 
 9. Id. at 813-15. 
 10. John G. Culhane, A ‘Clanging Silence’: Same-Sex Couples and Tort Law, 89 KY. 
L.J. 911 (2000-2001) (hereinafter Culhane, Clanging Silence). 
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common law front.  Recent developments have begun to bear out this 
prediction.  In a few states, wrongful death laws have advanced to provide 
recovery to some same-sex couples.  In New York, a significant case was 
decided in a manner that avoids the strictures of the State’s wrongful death 
laws.  In contrast, a “clanging silence” persists in the area of same-sex 
couples and the common law torts of loss of consortium and negligent 
infliction of emotional harm. 
This Article begins with a discussion of the suffocating restrictions on 
the class of eligible beneficiaries under most wrongful death statutes, and 
then considers recent legislative and judicial initiatives that have begun to 
change these laws to reflect reality.  The Article goes on to analyze the 
Victim Compensation Fund, passed in response to the tragic events of 
September 11, 2001, as a powerful example of the ability of legislative and 
regulatory rules to define eligibility for flexible recovery.  The approach 
used by the Fund ties compensation to real loss, rather than to status.11 
Next, the Article discusses recent legislative and judicial developments 
involving the torts of negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of 
consortium.  This analysis emphasizes the point that courts and legislatures 
are increasingly willing to recognize the reality of people’s relationships, 
even when those relationships do not enjoy the approbation uniquely 
accorded to marriage.  I conclude by offering a few observations that might 
provide some explanation for the curious absence of same-sex couples 
from the decisional law. 
I.  WRONGFUL DEATH LAW: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
In most states, a statutory gap exists between the loss for which 
wrongful death compensates and eligibility to recover for that loss.  This 
gap affects surviving members of same-sex couples in an obvious way, but 
affects many other kinds of relationships as well. 
Recovery under wrongful death statutes in most states compensates for 
the pecuniary loss caused by the primary victim’s death.  Such loss is based 
on the support that the deceased had provided, and would have been 
expected to continue providing the survivor, had the defendant’s 
negligence not prematurely ended the relationship.12  A state’s statute may 
also permit compensation for something like emotional injury or loss of 
 
 11. See infra Part I.C for further analysis. 
 12. See DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS, supra note 1, § 22.03; see also ALASKA STAT. § 
09.55.580(c)(1) (Michie 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3724(d)(1) (2004) (permitting 
recovery for pecuniary loss resulting from wrongful death). 
Deleted: PP1
Deleted: 3/19/2005
Deleted: 1:02 PM
278874-TEXT.NATIVE.1325881553.DOC 1/6/2012  12:26:42 PM 
2005] EVEN MORE WRONGFUL DEATH  105 
 
consortium.13  For simplicity’s sake, this Article will focus on the 
pecuniary loss issue.14 
Who is likely to suffer such loss?  The statutes generally provide a 
reasonable “guess list” that probably works in most cases: spouses, 
children, and, sometimes, parents and siblings.15  Some also allow recovery 
for anyone else entitled to take under the state’s law of intestacy, but 
sometimes only if one of the “primary” beneficiaries, namely spouses and 
children, does not exist.16 
The problem with such laws should be obvious enough, as a few 
examples will illustrate.  What if the decedent was supporting a parent in a 
jurisdiction that does not allow recovery for parents?  Or what about a 
housekeeper whose long service to her employer was rewarded with 
regular financial and other gifts that the housekeeper relied upon?  With 
special relevance to our discussion, what about an unmarried partnerof 
the same or the opposite sexwho is not on the “list” of eligible 
beneficiaries, even though he or she was, in fact, the sole dependent of the 
decedent?  In most states, none of these people even have standing to seek 
recovery.17  Thus, courts never reach the question of whether they have 
suffered a loss that would otherwise be compensable. 
Note that the result is no different where the survivor is the sole 
beneficiary under the decedent’s will.  In that case, the party in question 
would get all of the assets of the decedent’s estate, but none of the expected 
 
 13. The statutes compensate for loss of consortium only after death.  For losses 
occurring before death (or where death is not caused by the negligent conduct), the common 
law applies.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 280 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Iowa 
1979). 
 14. In many cases, if not most, the pecuniary losses will far outstrip the emotional losses 
(at least from the point of view of dollars recoverable in a lawsuit).  As I have argued 
elsewhere, this devastating financial loss, combined with the simple fact that the wrongful 
death suit is often the only vehicle for recovering for any loss at all, explains why suits by 
surviving members of same-sex couples are more common than other suits claiming 
relational injuries (loss of consortium or negligent infliction of emotional distress).  In the 
latter cases, the primary lawsuit for personal injury has a much greater value than the 
derivative claims based on the relationship, so attorneys and their clients may be fearful of 
jeopardizing the more valuable claim by putting the same-sex relationship before the jury.  
The fact that there have been claims by unmarried opposite-sex couplesbut virtually none 
by same-sex couplesindirectly supports the point.  See Culhane, Clanging Silence, supra 
note 10, at 974-79. 
 15. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3724(a). 
 16. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60(a) (West 2004). 
 17. Typically, the personal representative of the decedent’s estate is charged under the 
statute with bringing the claim, but recovery is limited to those specific classes mentioned in 
the text.  See, e.g., PA. R. CIV. P. No. 2202 (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1492(a)-
(c) (2003). 
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future support that is the corpus of a wrongful death recovery. 
Clearly, the statutes are out of step with social reality.  The question then 
becomes:  What is the best solution?  Several state statutes, as well as the 
Victim Compensation Fund, have advanced beyond the archaic assumption 
that actual loss mirrors legal or biological status.18  Even in the absence of 
a modern statute, there has been some judicial movement in the direction of 
recognizing real loss.  The best example of such forward thinking can be 
found in Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, a recent New York decision.19  
These statutory and judicial developments merit discussion. 
A.  Statutory Advances in Wrongful Death Law 
Michigan is one of the few states attempting to tie recovery to loss by 
allowing recovery to those entitled to take under a will, assuming they can 
prove actual loss.20  Michigan, like most states, also grants standing to 
close relatives, even if they were not named in the will.21  Of course, the 
correlation between loss and standing to recover for that loss is not 
complete, even in Michigan.  For example, absent a will, an unmarried 
partner who was financially dependent on the decedent would not have a 
 
 18. See infra Part I.A for further discussion. 
 19. 765 N.Y.S.2d 411, 414 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (recognizing Vermont civil unions of a 
same-sex couple for purposes of New York wrongful death statute so long as it did not 
offend public policy). 
 20. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922(1)-(3)(c) (West 2004).  The Michigan statute 
provides, in relevant part: 
 (1) Whenever the death of a person or injuries resulting in death shall be caused 
by wrongful act, neglect, or fault of another, and the act, neglect, or fault is such 
as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an 
action and recover damages, the person who or the corporation that would have 
been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, 
notwithstanding the death of the person injured . . . . 
 (2) Every action under this section shall be brought by, and in the name of, the 
personal representative of the estate of the deceased person . . . . 
 (3) [T]he person or persons who may be entitled to damages under this section 
shall be limited to any of the following who suffer damages and survive the 
deceased: 
  (a) The deceased’s spouse, children, descendants, parents, grandparents, brothers 
and sisters, and, if none of these persons survive the deceased, then those persons 
to whom the estate of the deceased would pass under the laws of intestate 
succession determined as of the date of death of the deceased. 
  (b) The children of the deceased’s spouse. 
  (c) Those persons who are devisees under the will of the deceased, except those 
whose relationship with the decedent violated Michigan law . . . . 
Id. 
 21. Id. at (3)(a). 
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claim.  But at least the “will option” provides an alternative to no recovery 
at all.  This alternative could be used by same-sex couples, who in any 
event should protect themselves to the extent they can.22  Thus, the 
Michigan statute moves strongly towards the goal of compensation for real 
loss.  The statute also reinforces a message that should by now be a mantra 
to gay persons, whether they are in intimate relationships or not: protect 
yourself through a will.23 
In important respects, the Michigan law is preferable to laws that include 
“formal” same-sex couples among their classes of eligible beneficiaries.  
Such laws do challenge the assumptions about relationships that underlie 
wrongful death laws, but only by adding one more narrowly defined 
category to the class of eligible beneficiaries.  Thus, a statute like 
California’s, that allows recovery to a surviving domestic partner, leaves 
behind many other kinds of “non-traditional” families.24  California law 
was amended in 2001 to add domestic partners to the list of eligible 
 
 22. Of course, many unmarried couples (whether of the same or opposite sex) lack the 
wherewithal to execute the planning documents necessary to protect themselves through 
such instruments as wills, living wills, and powers of attorney.  Marriage can take care of 
some of these problems (at least in the average case) by creating default assumptions.  But 
this option does not answer the question whether marriage should be necessary for the 
creation of such assumptions, nor does it address in any way the problems faced by many 
same-sex couples, who are deprived of the option of marrying. 
 23. The Michigan statute also has another interesting wrinkle that might be relevant to a 
same-sex couple.  In the same subsection of the statute that grants recovery to devisees 
under a will, recovery is expressly withheld from “those whose relationship with the 
decedent violated Michigan law . . . .”  Id. at (3)(c).  In the wake of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003), a same-sex couple’s intimate relationship could not be said to violate the 
law.  What about a putative same-sex marriage (since such unions are prohibited under 
Michigan’s Defense of Marriage Act)?  It would seem that since the couple cannot get 
married, their relationship would not be marriage, and therefore would not violate Michigan 
law.  The availability of civil unions in Vermont and (especially) of marriage in Canada 
might complicate the issue. 
 24. The California law was amended in 2001 to include “domestic partners” in the class 
of those eligible to recover for wrongful death.  The relevant language is as follows: 
A cause of action for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect 
of another may be asserted by any of the following persons or by the decedent’s 
personal representative on their behalf: 
  (a) The decedent’s surviving spouse, domestic partner, children, and issue of 
deceased children, or, if there is no surviving issue of the decedent, the person, 
including the surviving spouse or domestic partner, who would be entitled to the 
property of the decedent by intestate succession. 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (West 2004) (emphasis added to highlight 2001 
amendments).  Domestic partnership registration is limited to same-sex couples and to 
opposite-sex couples where one member of the couple is at least sixty-two years of age.  
CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(5)(A)-(B) (West 2004).  Of course, a couple must register as a 
domestic partnership in order to gain these benefits. 
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beneficiaries.  As is the case with much legislation, this amendment was 
passed in response to political pressure created by an incident that gathered 
a great deal of attention.   
In early 2001, Diane Whipple was mauled to death by a dog under 
circumstances of pet owner misconduct so serious that the couple who 
owned the dog faced criminal charges.25  Under the wrongful death law as 
written, it seemed that her surviving same-sex partner, who was not a 
spouse under a strict reading of the law, would not be entitled to pursue a 
claim against the dog owners.  Yet the decedent’s mother did have a claim, 
even though her actual financial loss was insignificant compared to that of 
the surviving partner, Sharon Smith.26  Surprisingly, Smith’s case survived 
 
 25. For an account of the tragic circumstances of Diane Whipple’s death, see John 
Gallagher, Looking for Meaning in Tragedy, ADVOCATE, at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1589/is_2001_April_24/ai_73308457 (Apr. 24, 
2001).  Marjorie Knoller and Robert Noel, the couple charged in connection with Whipple’s 
death, were both convicted of involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to four years in 
prison.  Knoller Gets Maximum Manslaughter Sentence, DATA LOUNGE, at 
http://www.datalounge.com/datalounge/news/record.html?record=20068 (July 16, 2002).  
The jury also found Knoller, who was controlling the dogs at the time of the attack, guilty of 
second-degree murder.  The judge, however, threw out that finding, citing a lack of evidence 
to support such a conviction.  Knoller and Noel have both since been paroled after receiving 
time off for good behavior, and both are appealing their convictions.  Moreover, the 
California Attorney General’s office is appealing the dismissal of Knoller’s second murder 
conviction.  Woman Convicted in Dog-Mauling Death is Freed, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 2, 
2004, available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/01/02/dog.attack.ap/.  On April 11, 
2003, the appellant, the People of the State of California, submitted its opening appellate 
brief to the California Court of Appeals, First District.  The issues being contended by the 
state are: 
A. The effect of the trial court’s ruling in this case was to independently assess the 
evidence and find it contrary to the verdict. 
B. The trial court applied a legally erroneous standard in assessing implied malice. 
C. The trial court’s reassessment of Knoller’s credibility on the issue of subjective 
knowledge was contrary to the law and evidence. 
D. The trial court erroneously relied on the relative culpability of the two 
defendants in setting aside Knoller’s second-degree murder conviction. 
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 44, California v. Knoller, No. A099366 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 
11,  2003), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/sfdogattack/caknoller41103cabrf.pdf (last visited Dec. 
4, 2004).  As of April 7, 2004, both sides had submitted briefs, and as of December 1, 2004, 
the case was on the conference list.  The People v. Knoller: Docket Entries, California 
Appellate Courts Case Information, at 
http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/dockets.cfm?dist=1&doc_id=51437&div=2 
(last visited Dec. 4, 2004). 
 26. At least a strict reading of the statute would not have permitted recovery.  But the 
trial court allowed the case to proceed even under the former law.  Smith v. Knoller, No. 
319532 (Cal. Super. Ct.Aug. 9, 2001).  The court reasoned that the statute, if read to exclude 
plaintiff, would create an insurmountable burden to her recovery (because there was no way 
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a motion to dismiss despite the statute’s apparently clear directive.27  In 
reaching its decision, the trial court noted that while Smith and Whipple 
could have entered into various legally enforceable agreements to protect 
their financial and personal interests, there was no way to avoid the 
strictures of the wrongful death law.  Thus, the court declined to read the 
statute to create an “insurmountable obstacle” to recovery.  Such an 
obstacle, the opinion noted, was at odds with the purpose behind the 
wrongful death statute, which is “to provide compensation for the loss . . . 
resulting from decedent’s death . . . .  [P]laintiff’s sexuality has no relation 
to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted upon her and denying 
recovery would be a windfall for the tortfeasor.”28 
The change to the California law solved the wrongful death problem for 
those same-sex couples registered as domestic partners, and has the virtue 
of placing same-sex relationships on the same footing as opposite-sex ones, 
at least in this one relatively narrow area of the law.  Note, too, that the 
statute was amended just one year after California voters approved a 
proposition that defined marriage as existing between a man and a 
womana Defense of Marriage Act through the California initiative 
process.29  And in fact the opponents of the domestic partner legislation 
leaned heavily on that initiative, ultimately to no avail.  This willingness to 
work around the Defense of Marriage initiative illustrates that people are 
 
to contract around the prohibition against recovery), and held that the statute had to be 
interpreted to allow surviving members of same-sex couples to recover (upon a sufficient 
factual showing) to save it from unconstitutionality as a violation of equal protection.  Id. 
slip op. at 3-4. 
 27. Smith, No. 319532. 
 28. Id. slip op. at 3-4.  In recognizing that wrongful death law should not penalize a 
party who is unable to protect him or herself, the court developed a line of argument that 
traces back to Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), in which the Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional laws that discriminated against out-of-wedlock children in actions to 
recover for a relative’s death.  In so holding, the Court articulated rationales that closely 
parallel those invoked by the Smith court, including the “intimate, familial relationship,” the 
wrong suffered, the unfairness of denying rights for a status beyond the individual’s control, 
and the prospect of a windfall to the tortfeasor.  Id. at 71-72.  In sum, the Court found that 
the classification had “no relation to the nature of the wrong” suffered.  Id. at 72. 
 29. The national legislation called the Defense of Marriage Act was enacted in 1996, 
and both defines marriage as the union of one man and one woman for federal purposes and 
expressly permits states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states.  
Defense of Marriage Act, codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2004), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2004).  Since 
that time, most states, including California, have enacted so-called “mini-DOMA’s” that 
purport to deny recognition to same-sex marriages performed in other states.  For an up-to-
date compilation of these laws, see 
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=20716&TEMPLATE=/
TaggedPage/TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=66 (last visited Jan. 31, 2005). 
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more comfortable conferring the benefits of marriage than the marriage 
label itself. 
The legislation, however, only helps those same-sex couples who 
register as domestic partners.  In fact, the new law does not even help most 
unmarried opposite-sex couples, who are not eligible for domestic partner 
status unless one member of the couple is over the age of 62.30  
Accordingly, the law has simply added one group to the list of eligible 
beneficiaries without addressing the broader problem of tying recovery to 
actual loss.31  To those in Sharon Smith’s situation, though, the California 
law is good enough. 
A New Jersey plaintiff, by contrast, would likely find that the domestic 
partnership law in that state would be of no help at all.  While same-sex 
couples may register as domestic partners, the very limited “plate” of rights 
offered does not include tort claims based on the injury to or destruction of 
relationships.32  The exclusion seems at odds with at least two related 
justifications for enacting the law offered by the legislature.  First, there are 
“a significant number of individuals . . . who . . . live together in important 
personal, emotional and economic committed relationships with another 
individual.”33  Second, these “familial relationships, which are known as 
domestic partnerships, assist the State by their establishment of a private 
network of support for the financial, physical and emotional health of their 
participants.”34  If surviving members of same-sex relationships are not 
permitted to recover for wrongful death, the odds are greatly increased that 
the state will have to become involved in the survivor’s support, thereby 
undermining the rationale that supported enacting the domestic relationship 
law in the first place.  Inasmuch as the state may need to step in to provide 
the support that should properly be charged to a negligent (or even more 
culpable) party, the legislature’s failure to include the right to sue for 
wrongful death under the benefits afforded domestic partnerships is indeed 
puzzling. 
While New Jersey’s law does not do enough,35 Vermont law solves the 
 
 30. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(6)(B) (West 2004). 
 31. For the sake of completeness, I should note that the California law also allows 
certain other dependents to recover.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60(b) (West 2004).  This 
provision is a less comprehensive alternative to Michigan’s approach. 
 32. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-2 (West 2004). 
 33. Id.  at (a). 
 34. Id.  at (b). 
 35. An interesting question would arise if a New Jersey couple that had been civilly 
united in Vermont attempted to bring a wrongful death suit for an accident that occurred in 
New Jersey.  New Jersey’s domestic partnership law states that it will recognize equivalent 
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problems of wrongful death, as well as many other legal deprivations 
typically suffered by same-sex couples, by throwing the protective blanket 
of civil union status over same-sex couples who choose to enter into that 
relationship.36  A civil union is a marriageinsofar as the state but not the 
federal government is concernedin all but name.37  The statute creating 
the institution of civil unions explicitly lists the right to sue in wrongful 
death among those now enjoyed by same-sex couples,38 but the inclusion of 
that and all specific rights is superfluous since the statute explicitly confers 
“all” of the benefits of marriage on same-sex couples.39 
By responding to the specific issue of recognition of same-sex 
partnerships before them, the Vermont legislators naturally had no occasion 
to take up the broader question under discussion here: how to craft 
wrongful death laws in a way that reflects real loss.  Legislative reforms in 
California and Vermont have benefited no one but same-sex couples.  
Michigan’s remains the better approach. 
B.  Judicial Advances in Wrongful Death Law 
Despite the status-based impediments to suit that remain in almost every 
state, a few surviving members of same-sex couples have nonetheless 
 
statuses from other states, including civil unions.  But it seems unlikely that a New Jersey 
court would interpret that provision to mean that the couple would be entitled to all of the 
rights that such status confers on Vermont residents.  Since New Jersey does not include the 
right to sue for wrongful death under its domestic partnership status, the surviving member 
of the couple would probably not be able to claim that his Vermont civil union entitles him 
to greater rights than those enjoyed by those who registered for domestic partnership status 
in New Jersey.  A court might use principles of full faith and credit, or comity, to grant the 
more expansive Vermont rights though.  See Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 
411 (Sup. Ct. 2003). 
 36. The civil union was a compromise hewn from a decision by the Vermont Supreme 
Court in Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999), in which the court held that the state 
could not, under the state constitution, deprive same-sex couples the benefits of marriage, 
but left to the legislature the issue of how best to confer those benefits.  Faced with this 
directive, the legislature cobbled together an altogether new entity, the civil union, which 
confers all of the benefits of marriage, but withholds the label.  For a criticism of this 
outcome that takes its inspiration from Justice Johnson’s partial concurrence urging that full 
marriage rights be conferred on same-sex couples, see John G. Culhane, A Tale of Two 
Concurrences: Same-Sex Marriage and Products Liability, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
447 (2001).  The legislative and executive goings-on that led to the establishment of the 
civil union law are masterfully and sympathetically described in DAVID MOATS, CIVIL 
WARS: A BATTLE FOR GAY MARRIAGE (2004). 
 37. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2003). 
 38. § 1204(e)(2).  The civil union statute also lists the right to file claims for loss of 
consortium and emotional distress among the benefits.  Id.  These provisions are discussed 
further in Part II, infra. 
 39. § 1204(a). 
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brought claims for wrongful death.  Given the apparently unambiguous 
language of most statutes, these claims are surprising in two respects: first, 
it is surprising that they have been brought at all; and second, at least three 
of these have survived motions to dismiss.  The reason for bringing them is 
quite likely necessity.  Where a surviving same-sex partner was in the kind 
of committed, long-term, and financially interdependent relationship that 
would have meant substantial financial (and likely emotional) support to 
the survivor, a wrongful death suit may present the only prospect of 
continued financial health.  The following discussion of relevant cases40 
reveals the explanation for plaintiffs’ ability to survive dispositive motions. 
The most recent, and well-publicized case is Langan v. St. Vincent’s 
Hospital.41  In this case, a trial judge in New York State recognized a civil 
union entered into by two New York residents in Vermont.  More 
specifically, the judge recognized the union for the limited purpose of 
allowing the survivor’s wrongful death claim to proceed under New York’s 
Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law.42 
In Langan, Neal Spicehandler died, allegedly as the result of medical 
malpractice, and his surviving partner, John Langan, brought suit against 
St. Vincent’s Hospital for wrongful death.43  The New York wrongful 
death statute, like the majority of laws, restricts recovery to named classes 
of beneficiaries, including spouses but not unmarried partners.44  The court, 
however, permitted Langan’s case to proceed despite this apparent 
infirmity. 
The court used a great number of tools in constructing its decision.  
First, Justice Dunne emphasized that Langan and Spicehandler were, in 
every way possible, a couple.  They had been together for fifteen years, had 
jointly bought a house, were completely financially and legally intertwined 
through wills and life insurance policies, and had traveled to Vermont and 
entered into a civil union, which evinced their desire to confirm their status 
as a couple to the extent legally possible.45  The court also pointed to the 
willingness of New York courts to read certain laws expansively to give 
legal standing to the surviving member of same-sex couples in other areas, 
 
 40. Two of the three cases alluded to in the text are discussed herein.  The third, Smith v. 
Knoller, No. 319532 (Cal. Super. Ct.Aug. 9, 2001), was discussed in connection with the 
California statute, supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text. 
 41. 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. 2003). 
 42. Id. at 422. 
 43. Id. at 412. 
 44. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.4(a) (McKinney 2004). 
 45. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 412-13. 
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including accession to rent-controlled apartments,46 and the willingness of 
the New York legislature (which is fairly progressive on same-sex issues) 
to grant rights in such diverse areas as adoption,47 discrimination,48 and 
eligibility for certain state-conferred death benefits.49 
The court also stressed the importance of recognizing a sister state’s 
laws, including Vermont’s civil union law.50  This formed the critical piece 
of the opinion, even though the court limited its holding to the wrongful 
death context, and said it was not expressing an opinion more generally 
about the status of the couple as married or not.51 
Finally, and with special relevance to this discussion, the court also 
discussed the purpose of the wrongful death laws; in short, the court 
wanted to find a way to achieve the statute’s purpose even if its specific 
language seemed to prohibit doing so.52  Justice Dunne believed that this 
task had special urgency because of the potential equal protection problem 
that a contrary finding would create:53 
There is a compelling reason to construe the [law] to include a Vermont 
spouse under the fundamental tenet of construction that a statute ought 
normally to be saved by construing it in accord with constitutional 
requirements . . . . [I]t is impossible to justify, under equal protection 
principles, withholding . . . recognition from a union which meets all the 
requirements of a marriage in New York but for the sexual orientation of 
its partners.54 
Langan is a progressive decision that nonetheless leaves several 
questions unanswered.  May surviving members of same-sex couples have 
standing under wrongful death laws even if they do not go to Vermont to 
engage in a civil union, or perhaps to Massachusetts to get married?55  Will 
 
 46. Id. at 415 (citing Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989)). 
 47. Id. at 416 (citing Matter of Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995)). 
 48. Id. (citing N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c(2) (McKinney 2004); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 
291(1)-(2) (McKinney 2004)). 
 49. Id. (citing NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., LOCAL LAW No. 24 Int. 114-A (2002)). 
 50. Id. at 418. 
 51. Id. at 422. 
 52. Id. at 419-21. 
 53. This approach was suggested by Judge Rosenberger in his dissent in Raum v. 
Restaurant Associates, Inc., 675 N.Y.S.2d 343, 345 (App. Div. 1998) (Rosenberger, J., 
dissenting). 
 54. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 420-21 (internal quotation omitted). 
 55. See Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (requiring 
state to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples).  Same-sex marriage is now legal in 
Massachusetts.  But because of an archaic statute enacted to prevent interracial couples 
married in another state from having their marriages recognized in Massachusetts, marriage 
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New Jersey’s much less comprehensive domestic partnership suffice?56  If 
so, is this result sound, or advisable?  Will Langan be overturned on 
appeal?57 
Evidence that “civil union” or equivalent status is not essential to 
recovery in wrongful death can be found in the earlier case of Solomon v. 
District of Columbia,58 in which a trial judge declared that a surviving 
same-sex partner should be considered “next of kin,” thereby qualifying for 
 
licenses have thus far been given only to Massachusetts residents, with a few contested 
exceptions.  See Pam Belluck, Eight Diverse Gay Couples Join to Fight Massachusetts, 
N.Y. TIMES, June, 18, 2004, at A22 (chronicling effort by Govenor Mitt Romney to prevent 
out-of-state same-sex couples from marrying in Massachusetts, and temporary defiance of 
that order by several towns).   Getting married in Canada, where there is no residency 
requirement for marriage, is another option.  Courts in Ontario, Quebec, and British 
Columbia have held that denying marriage to same-sex couples is a violation of their rights 
and is “unjustified discrimination.”  A good account of the decisions from these courts can 
be found on the Canadian website of Equal Marriage for Same-Sex Couples.  Status of 
Legal Challenges: Equal Marriage Arrives in Canada! (Equal Marriage for Same-Sex 
Couples, Ontario, Canada), available at 
http://www.samesexmarriage.ca/legal/index.html#canada (last visited Dec. 2, 2004).  
Moreover, the Canadian federal government has sent a draft billone that would change the 
definition of marriage to include same-sex marriagesto the Supreme Court of Canada for 
its opinion concerning the constitutionality of such a bill.  Id. 
 56. Unlike Vermont’s civil union law, or Canada’s marriage laws, most legal statuses 
available to same-sex couples require that the couple be resident in the state in which the 
status is sought.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-4 (West 2004) (defining having a 
common residence).  But difficult issues could still arise in tort.  For example, if a couple 
registered as domestic partners and residents in New Jersey were involved in an automobile 
accident in New York, New York law might well apply to the tort claim.  See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) (listing factors for determining significance: 
the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties; 
the location of the wrongful conduct and the injury; and the residence of the parties).  In 
such a case would domestic partnership also be regarded as a spousal relationship for 
purposes of wrongful death law? 
 57. St. Vincent’s Hospital is currently appealing the decision of the Nassau County 
Supreme Court that allowed Langan to bring a wrongful death suit against the hospital for 
the death of his partner Neal Spicehandler.  Doug Windsor, Appeals Court Asked to Reject 
Bid to End Gay Wrongful Suit, 365Gay.com Newscenter, at 
http://www.365gay.com/newscon04/01/012004partnerSuit.htm (Jan. 20, 2004) (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2004).  The hospital is asking the Appeals Court to dismiss the suit on the grounds 
that same-sex couples are not legally recognized in New York.  Id.  Oral arguments were 
heard on June 22, 2004, and, as of this writing, the case was in the hands of a four-judge 
panel.  Michael Weissenstein, Court Weighs Appeal in Same-Sex Union Case, TIMES UNION, 
June 23, 2004, at B3, available at 
http://www.timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp?category=STATE&storyID=260000&BC
Code=&newsdate=6/23/2004 (last visited July 5, 2004).  As of February 15, 2005, no 
decision had been reached on this appeal. 
 58. 21 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1305, 1326 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1995). 
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recovery under the wrongful death law.59  In that case, a lesbian couple had 
two children who clearly qualified as wrongful death plaintiffs.  The court 
recognized the absurdity that would have resulted from recognizing the 
children, but not the dependent partner, as wrongful death plaintiffs: “It is 
clear that the two children are eligible to receive remedy  .  .  .  .  Since 
[plaintiff] also relied on [the decedent] for support and maintenance, logic 
dictates that she is also entitled to remedies .  .  .  .”60  The court can be 
faulted for a questionable reading of the intestacy laws on which eligibility 
for wrongful death recovery depends,61 but the problem-solving impulse is 
easy to understand.  Had the surviving spouse not been permitted to 
recover, the children would likely have suffered because the money 
“earmarked” for the plaintiff could have benefited the entire family unit. 
Once recognized by law, same-sex marriage would eliminate the 
difficulty of gaining recovery for wrongful death for couples who choose to 
marry.  As the foregoing discussion illustrates, however, the problems with 
wrongful death law are broader.  These laws must be amended, perhaps 
along the lines of the approach taken by Michigan.  Although not every 
case of loss will be covered (because not everyone has a will), at least 
parties will have the means of protecting themselves through careful estate 
planning.  The best approach would be to grant standing to any party who 
can make a preliminary showing of the kind of loss for which wrongful 
death laws are intended to compensate. 
C.  Beyond Tort: The Victim Compensation Fund 
The Victim Compensation Fund (“VCF”), created in response to the 
horrific events of September 11, 2001, was probably a one-time-only 
response to a national tragedy.62  The Fund bears similarity to state 
wrongful death law, in that many of the Fund’s payments went to surviving 
family members of those killed by the terrorist attacks of that day.63  
 
 59. Id.; 21 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1305, 1316 (D.C. Super. Ct., No. 94-2709, Apr. 26, 
1995). 
 60. (Author, Title?)1994 LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES 83 (quoting Solomon, No. 94-2709 
(D.C. Super. Ct. 1995)).  Id.  The decision is only summarized in the BNA Family Law 
Reporter.  Quoted language is taken from the 1995 LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES 83. 
 61. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-301-316 (2003); see also Lewis v. Lewis, 708 A.2d 249, 
251-52 (D.C. 1998). 
 62. For an extensive discussion of the Victim Compensation Fund and the challenge it 
presents to commonly understood notions of justice, see John G. Culhane, Tort, 
Compensation, and Two Kinds of Justice, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1027 (2003). 
 63. 2884 eligible families filed death claims with the Fund.  David W. Chen, Man 
Behind Sept. 11 Fund Describes Effort as a Success, With Reservations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 
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Further, as with the statutory wrongful death tort, most of the payments 
were for economic loss.64  The comparison is inexact, however, because the 
Fund also awarded payments for the victims’ pain and suffering.65  In that 
regard, the Fund was an amalgam of tort law (under survival statutes that 
preserve tort claims, including pain and suffering damages, for the estate 
after the victim’s death) and a limited compensation system (because the 
Special Master, Kenneth Feinberg, established flat payments for non-
economic loss to the victim, and to the bereft spouse and family members).  
Nonetheless, with respect to the hard economic damages that were at the 
core of compensation, the Fund exhibited a welcome flexibility both in its 
drafting and especially in its implementation.  Feinberg’s commitment to 
awarding payments based on real loss could inform state legislative 
initiatives to change wrongful death laws to reflect changed societal truths 
about family, relationship, and loss. 
For those killed on September 11, the VCF and its implementing Final 
Rule establish that eligibility for compensation vests in the decedent’s 
personal representative as determined by state law.66  Although many 
wrongful death statutes contemplate the personal representatives bringing 
suit,67 the amount actually recovered in such a suit is limited as described 
earlier: typically, only those in certain narrowly defined relationships have 
standing to recover.68  The Fund, in contrast, is open-ended about who is 
entitled to recover for the economic loss.  Although the statute could have 
been interpreted to mean that only the personal representative would be 
entitled to recover, Feinberg used his discretion in permitting recovery to 
 
2004, at B1.  As to non-economic loss, the regulations passed pursuant to the Fund establish 
a presumption of a $250,000 loss for each decedent plus an additional $100,000 for the 
decedent’s spouse and each of the decedent’s dependents.  28 C.F.R. § 104.44 (2004).  As to 
economic loss, the regulations mandate a consideration of loss of future earnings or cost of 
replacement services, medical expense losses, and losses due to burial costs.  28 C.F.R. § 
104.43. 
 64. The difference between the minimum amount of recovery for non-economic loss 
($250,000) and the average total award paid out to victims’ families ($2,082,035) can be 
attributed to economic loss.  See 28 C.F.R. § 104.44; September 11th Victim Compensation 
Fund of 2001, Table I: General Award Statistics, at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/payments_deceased.html (last updated Dec. 3, 
2004). 
 65. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 
Stat. 230, § 402(7) (2005). 
 66. Id. at § 405 (c)(2)(C) (personal representative brings claim on behalf of estate).  
Final Rule, 28 C.F.R. Part 104, § 104.4 (state law applies). 
 67. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.20 (West 2004); PA. R. CIV. P. No. 2202(a) (West 
2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1492(a) (2003) (all mandating that action be brought by 
decedent’s personal representative). 
 68. See supra Part I. 
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follow actual loss.69  This flexible approach meant that many of those who 
would otherwise be left out of wrongful death recoveryincluding but not 
limited to unmarried, intimate partners (same or opposite-sex)did in fact 
recover, even where they would not been entitled to similar recovery as 
wrongful death beneficiaries under state law.70  New York State, home to 
most of the victims, made the point even more clearly by passing 
legislation that specifically permitted surviving members of same-sex 
couples to recover for the events of September 11.71 
It is risky to draw conclusions from the approach taken by Congress in 
setting up the Fund.  Nonetheless, the Fund represents an advance over 
even the Michigan law described earlier because Feinberg allowed 
recovery to be tied to loss; those receiving compensation were not even 
required to be named under a will.72 
One can hope that the charitable impulse that prompted the broad 
definition of eligible beneficiaries under the Fund will herald a true 
revolution in wrongful death law and not a one-time-only accommodation. 
II.  LESSONS FROM ADVANCES IN OTHER RELATIONAL TORTS 
Just as the statutory and decisional law of wrongful death has begun to 
advance towards conferring benefits upon surviving members of same-sex 
couples, so too have courts permitted broader recovery for negligently 
 
 69. See infra note 70. 
 70. September 11th Fund Awards Compensation to Same-Sex Surviving Partner, GLAD: 
EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, at http://www.glad.org/News_Room/press75-5-6-04.html 
(May 6, 2004).  For example, the Fund compensated Nancy Walsh of New Hampshire for 
losses associated with the death of her partner, Carol Flyzik, in the September 11 attacks.  
Id. 
 71. September 11th Victims and Families Relief Act, 2002 N.Y. Laws 73 (amending the 
worker’s compensation law, the estates, powers and trusts law, and the surrogate’s court 
Procedure Act in order to assist victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks and their 
families).  The New York legislature was explicit about its desire to assist surviving 
members of same-sex couples with compensation under the Fund.  The provision setting 
forth legislative intent reads as follows: 
[T]hat domestic partners of victims of the terrorist attacks are eligible for 
distributions from the federal victim compensation fund, and the requirements for 
awards under the New York State World Trade Center Relief Fund and other 
existing state laws, regulations, and executive orders should guide the federal 
special master in determining awards and ensuring that the distribution plan 
compensates such domestic partners for the losses they sustained. 
2002 N.Y. Laws 73, § 1.  For a comprehensive discussion of the substantial changes to the 
New York law wrought by the events of September 11, see John O. Enright, Comment, New 
York’s Post-September 11, 2001 Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships: A Victory 
Suggestive of Future Change, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2823, 2854-62 (2004). 
 72. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
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inflicted emotional distress and loss of consortium claims.  In the 
legislative arena, same-sex couples in a few states have benefited from 
statutorily protected status.  Though courts have also moved towards a 
more flexible approach, thus far only opposite-sex couples have profited 
from these decisions.  This brief section discusses both legislative and 
judicial changes to the law, and argues that the differences between the two 
do have a plausible explanation.  Moreover, because of the close 
connection between wrongful death and the “living” relational torts, 
progress with respect to one nourishes the other. 
 
A. Legislative Changes in the Law of Harm to Relational Interests 
Because of the inherent elasticity of claims based on harms to “family 
relations,” state legislators have generally left issues concerning the 
permissible reach of such actions to the judiciary, whose institutional 
design is better suited to dealing with nuance.  Thus, legislative 
contributions to the development of the tort have been limited to 
recognizing formal equality between similarly situated couples. 
More specifically, only those states that have moved strongly in the 
direction of recognizing the legal equality of same and opposite-sex 
couples have extended gay couples the right to recover for harm to 
relations.  Even then, recognition depends on the couple’s willingness to 
enter into the marriage-like institution available in that state.  Thus, 
Vermont’s civil union law lists the rights to recover for loss of consortium 
and for negligently inflicted emotional harm among the full panoply of 
rights accorded parties to a civil union.  In Massachusetts, where same-sex 
marriage is now legal, all of the rights attendant to that statusincluding 
tort rightsare presumably available to all married couples.73 
In states that have taken smaller steps towards equality, the results have 
 
 73. There is currently a movement within the Massachusetts legislature to amend the 
state’s constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage.  At the state level, the amendment would 
need to be passed by two consecutive sessions of the legislature, and then approved by a 
simple majority of the voters.  MASS. CONST., art. XLVIII. This means that such an 
amendment could not take effect until 2006, at the earliest.  In March 2004, the legislature 
did pass an amendment that, if ultimately approved, would permit civil unions to same-sex 
couples, but exclude such couples from marriage.  See W. James Antle III, Bay-State 
Barometer, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Apr. 13, 2004, at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/antle_200404130908.asp (discussing view that 
the amendment is designed to fail by substituting civil unions, with all of the legal incidents 
of marriage, for marriage; compromise will not please either proponents or opponents of 
same-sex marriage). 
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been mixed.  In the wake of the horrific death of Diane Whipple and in 
light of the hurdles her partner faced in her effort to recover for wrongful 
death,74 California provided those same-sex couples who were registered as 
domestic partners with the right to sue for the harm to their relationships; 
claims for wrongful death, loss of consortium, and emotional harm caused 
by injury to another are now possible.75  Thus, tort rights were granted 
because consideration of the Whipple incident drove enactment of the 
statute. 
In Hawaii, as mentioned previously, reciprocal beneficiary status 
includes the right to sue for wrongful death.  Perhaps surprisingly, the 
statute does not expressly grant parties to a reciprocal beneficiary 
relationship the right to sue for loss of consortium or emotional distress for 
injury to their partners.  One explanation for this difference might be that 
wrongful death has historically been a matter for the legislature, whereas 
the other relational torts are typically dealt with in the courts.  Thus, a court 
might look to a plaintiff’s status as a reciprocal beneficiary and determine 
that common law tort rights are therefore available.76 
In all of the states discussed, if same-sex couples gain tort rights at all, it 
is only by equaling or approximating the status of heterosexual couples.  
The legislatures have left the more factually difficult issue of how to 
determine eligibility for recovery beyond formal legal and blood relations 
to the courts.  Recently, a few courts have ruled in the direction of greater 
flexibility. 
 
 74. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. 
 75. See generally CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a)-(c) (West 2004) (providing registered 
domestic partners with certain rights, protections, and benefits granted to spouses).  More 
specifically, standing to sue for wrongful death is granted to registered domestic partners by 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60(a) (West 2004), and standing to sue for negligently 
inflicted emotional distress is granted to registered domestic partners by CAL. CIV. CODE § 
1714.01(a) (West 2004). 
 76. One case strongly suggests that the court will regard reciprocal beneficiary status as 
equivalent to spousal status in torts based on injuries to relations.  Guth v. Freeland, 28 P.3d 
982 (Haw. 2001), required the court to interpret a statute prohibiting suits for emotional 
distress based on damage to property.  In holding that the law did not apply to claims for 
mishandling of a corpse, the court had this to say about standing to sue in such cases: “We 
define ‘immediate family members’ as the decedent’s surviving spouse, reciprocal 
beneficiary, children, parents, siblings, or any other person who in fact occupies an 
equivalent status.” Id. at 990 (citing wrongful death statute).  Although emotional distress 
arising from mishandling of corpses has been treated as a sui generis category of law, see 
DOBBS, supra note 2, at 825, 836-37, it seems reasonable to surmise that the court will 
regard reciprocal beneficiaries as spousal equivalents in both “run of the mill” emotional 
distress cases and in loss of consortium cases. 
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B.  Judicial Developments in Loss of Consortium and Emotional 
Distress 
Both loss of consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress 
have long, tortured histories that have been explained elsewhere77 and need 
not be revisited at length here.  Today, these torts purport to compensate 
plaintiffs for the loss that is tied in some part to a relationship between the 
plaintiff and the physically injured party.  A loss of consortium claim is 
based on the relationship itself, and allows recovery for the loss of society 
and, where appropriate, sexual relations.78  A claim for negligently inflicted 
emotional distress uses the relationship as a central requirement for 
recovery when the plaintiff was not in fear for his or her own safety.79 
With the contemporary bases of these torts thus stated, it is perhaps 
surprising that courts have been extremely reluctant to grant standing to 
plaintiffs who do not fall into certain formal, narrowly defined categories 
of relationships to the physically injured party.  The following observations 
refer to recent developments in each tort, noting that courts have, at long 
last, begun to move away from strict status-based standing requirements.  I 
also offer a brief explanation for the dearth of case law concerning same-
sex couples. 
1.  Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Because of the early common law’s aversion to claims not anchored in 
physical harm, recovery for emotional distress was at one time limited to 
those who had suffered a physical impact (however slight) from the 
defendant’s negligence.80  For more than a century, however, recovery has 
been expanding.  First, those who were within the so-called “zone of 
danger”those who feared for their own safetycould recover even 
absent harm to themselves.81  The logic for this expansion is evident; one 
 
 77. For a discussion of these histories see Culhane, Clanging Silence, supra note 10 at 
943-48 (negligent infliction of emotional distress), 949-53 (loss of consortium). 
 78. The most widely recognized claims for loss of consortium involve spouses; some 
states permit recovery for the loss of a child’s consortium, while a few allow a child to 
recover for loss of parental consortium.  See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 842.  In the parent-
child context, the emphasis is on the loss of society and companionship.  The discussion in 
the text concerns the spousal consortium claim. 
 79. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 80. See Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688, 697-98 (E.D. Ark. 
1959). 
 81. Conso. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 554 (1994) (surveying various tests for 
recovery and settling on the “zone of danger” test as most consistent with the underlying 
goals of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act). 
Deleted: PP1
Deleted: 3/19/2005
Deleted: 1:02 PM
278874-TEXT.NATIVE.1325881553.DOC 1/6/2012  12:26:42 PM 
2005] EVEN MORE WRONGFUL DEATH  121 
 
close enough to the scene of an accident to experience fear of being injured 
is especially likely to have suffered emotional distress.82  The distinction 
between slight impact and proximity was unmasked as administrative 
convenience that did not correspond to likely loss.  Virtually all states now 
permit recovery for emotional distress for those within the zone of 
danger.83 
The more recent movement of the law in this area has been more 
controversial, and its adoption has been less than universal.  Beginning 
with the iconic case of Dillon v. Legg,84 some courts have begun to permit 
those who simply witness injury to another to recover for their emotional 
harm.  But extending the tort in this way could lead to almost limitless 
liability.  As a chilling example, all of those who witnessed, even on 
television, the events of September 11, 2001, could potentially have a claim 
against any actor deemed to have acted negligently, such as those 
responsible for airport security.  To avert this possibility, courts have 
placed strict limits on the class of plaintiffs eligible to sue.  The two nearly 
universal requirements are that the plaintiff have a contemporaneous 
sensory awareness of the injury-causing event,85 and that the plaintiff and 
the physically injured party stand in close relation to each other.86  This last 
requirement has proven both vexatious to courts and disappointing to many 
who have suffered emotional injury. 
As originally conceived by the California Supreme Court in Dillon, 
“close relationship” was a factor relevant to the foreseeability of emotional 
distress.87  The court emphasized that foreseeability was a flexible concept, 
and that it could not predict the development of the case law relevant to this 
criterion.88  Because of this deliberate imprecision, lower courts in 
California gyrated about for more than two decades in a quixotic effort to 
define “close relationship.”89  With rare exceptions,90 recovery was limited 
 
 82. Id. at 547 (observing that “a near miss may be as frightening as a direct hit”). 
 83. Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Recovery Under State Law for Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress Due to Witnessing Injury to Another Where Bystander Plaintiff Must 
Suffer Physical Impact or Be in the Zone of Danger, 89 A.L.R.5th 255 (2004). 
 84. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). 
 85. Id. at 920. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 920-21. 
 88. Id. at 921 (stating that “reasonable foreseeability . . . contemplates that courts, on a 
case-to-case basis, analyzing all the circumstances, will decide what the ordinary man under 
such circumstances should reasonably have foreseen”). 
 89. See, e.g., Kriventsov v. San Rafael Taxicabs, Inc., 229 Cal. Rptr. 768 (Ct. App. 
1986) (finding close relationship between uncle and nephew); Mobaldi v. Regents of Univ. 
of Cal., 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 722 (Ct. App. 1976) (finding close relationship between foster 
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to those in close legal or blood relationships with the primary victim, and 
the California Supreme Court ultimately retreated from the flexible 
approach it had championed in Dillon.  In 1988, the court held that 
unmarried cohabitants were not eligible to bring emotional distress claims, 
the strength of their relationship notwithstanding.91  The following year, the 
court more comprehensively rejected “foreseeability factors” in favor of 
bright line rules.  Under the court’s new close relationships requirements, 
recovery would normally be limited to only parents, siblings, children, 
grandparents, and other relatives living in the same household.92 
No doubt daunted by the difficulty of assessing the “closeness” of 
relationships absent some marker of legality or consanguinity, most courts 
have followed this type of rote approach.93  A few courts, however, have 
begun to take a different approach.  The New Jersey Supreme Court 
ushered in this more searching analysis of “close relationship.”  In Dunphy 
v. Gregor,94 this progressive court rejected “a hastily-drawn ‘bright line’ 
distinction between married and unmarried persons”95 in favor of a more 
flexible approach that examined the strength and quality of the 
relationship.96  This movement away from status, while still a minority 
trend,97 gathered a bit of steam in Graves v. Estabrook, a recent New 
Hampshire case.98  The plaintiff’s fiancé had died a particularly grisly 
death, allegedly because of the defendant’s negligence, and she had 
witnessed the gruesome spectacle.99  Building from Dunphy, the Graves 
court rejected the defendant’s effort to disqualify Ms. Graves by tying 
standing to marital status.100  Instead, it honored the foreseeability 
 
parent and foster child).  But see Trapp v. Schuyler Constr., 197 Cal. Rptr. 411, 412 (Ct. 
App. 1983) (finding cousins not closely related). 
 90. See, e.g., Ledger v. Tippitt, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814, 826 (Ct. App. 1985) (allowing 
unmarried cohabitants standing in a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim). 
 91. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 585-86 (Cal. 1988). 
 92. Thing v. LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829 n.10 (Cal. 1989). 
 93. See, e.g., Kallstrom v. United States, 43 P.3d 162, 165 (Alaska 2002) (limiting close 
relationships to blood relationships); Grotts v. Zahner, 989 P.2d 415, 416 (Nev. 1999) 
(limiting close relationships to those established by blood or marriage). 
 94. 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994). 
 95. Id. at 376. 
 96. Id. at 377-78. 
 97. See generally Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Relationship Between Victim and 
PlaintiffWitness as Affecting Right to Recover Under State Law for Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress Due to Witnessing Injury to Another Where Bystander Plaintiff is Not 
Member of Victim’s Immediate Family, 98 A.L.R.5th 609 (2004). 
 98. 818 A.2d 1255 (N.H. 2003). 
 99. Id. at 1257. 
 100. Id. at 1258-59. 
Deleted: PP1
Deleted: 3/19/2005
Deleted: 1:02 PM
278874-TEXT.NATIVE.1325881553.DOC 1/6/2012  12:26:42 PM 
2005] EVEN MORE WRONGFUL DEATH  123 
 
requirement that California and other states have largely abandoned: 
“[f]oreseeability accounts for factual nuances, while a bright line rule is at 
odds with foreseeability.”101  The Graves court echoed Dunphy’s 
impatience with the arguments that recognizing such claims would devalue 
the institution of marriage or involve the courts in a messy examination of 
the quality of the relationships.102 
Judicial expansiveness in this area of the law is promising in several 
related ways.  First, it bespeaks a movement away from status that could be 
helpful to those who either choose or are forced to exist in relationships 
that do not enjoy state sanction.  Same-sex couples appear to have the 
strongest argument because they are precluded from marriage.  Second, to 
the extent that courts may move more swiftly than legislatures, these 
developments could augur change in the statutory law of wrongful death.  
As we have already observed, a few courts have not even waited for 
legislative change to the wrongful death laws before protecting the interests 
and expectations of same-sex survivors. 
2.  Loss of Consortium 
New York, New Jersey, New Hampshirethe most progressive cases 
discussed thus far are, aptly, from one of these “new” states.  New Mexico 
completes the “new” state sweep, as that state’s supreme court recently 
became the first such court to allow a loss of consortium claim by an 
unmarried cohabitant.  In Lozoya v. Sanchez,103 a unanimous court noted 
that the tort is based on the injury to the relation, not to a legal interest: 
“[t]o use the legal status as a proxy for a significant enough relational 
interest is not the most precise way to determine to whom a duty is 
owed.”104  Further, the court noted that basing recovery on legal status 
“necessarily excludes many persons whose loss of a significant relational 
interest may be just as devastating as the loss of a legal spouse.”105 
The developments in New Mexico over the past decade reveal the 
evolutionary capacity of the common law.  Until 1994, the State was alone 
in not recognizing loss of consortium at all.  In Romero v. Byers,106 the 
court recognized that a notion of duty tethered to foreseeability argued 
 
 101. Id. at 1261. 
 102. Id. at 1260. 
 103. 66 P.3d 948 (N.M. 2003). 
 104. Id. at 955. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 872 P.2d 840 (N.M. 1994). 
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powerfully for loss of consortium claims.107  Then, in 1998, the court 
expanded loss of consortium beyond the nuclear family, permitting a claim 
by certain grandparents for injuries to their grandchildren.108  Lozoya 
continued this expansion.109 
Given the court’s willingness to tie legal standing to real loss 
experienced by actual couples, it seems likely that same-sex couples would 
find a receptive audience for loss of consortium (and possibly emotional 
distress) claims in New Mexico, and perhaps in the other “new” states.  It 
might therefore seem surprising that no appellate decision on loss of 
consortium, and only one on negligent infliction of emotional harm,110 has 
been reported.  This state of affairs might seem especially puzzling in light 
of the claims for wrongful death discussed earlier, where even the apparent 
statutory bar has neither kept same-sex survivors from suing, nor 
universally resulted in dismissal by courts. 
The apparent paradox can likely be explained by the realities of 
litigation.  The potential recovery in a wrongful death suit may be quite 
substantial, and necessary for the surviving spouse to function 
economically.  Therefore, the only impediment to suit is the admittedly 
daunting challenge of finding a court sufficiently sympathetic to read the 
wrongful death statute expansively. 
Emotional distress and particularly loss of consortium claims, by 
contrast, are usually quite minor,111 particularly when compared with the 
often substantial physical injury claims from which they derive.  Given the 
danger that a jury may regard a same-sex couple unsympathetically, both 
potential plaintiffs and their attorneys may be loathe to jeopardize the “big 
ticket” personal injury claim to pursue a smaller and perilous claim for 
injury to the relation.  Nonetheless, the increasing acceptance of gay 
couples, combined with sympathetic treatment of such couples by a number 
of courts in a host of contexts, may make such a claim for emotional 
distress or loss of consortium likely in the not-to-distant future.  The first 
 
 107. Id. at 843-44.  Not all cases involving foreseeable risk, however, lead to a 
determination that the defendant owes the plaintiff a legal duty.  In Torres v. State, 894 P.2d 
386, 389-90 (N.M. 1995), the court stated that a finding of duty based on foreseeability 
could be overcome by strong countervailing public policy considerations.  For a discussion 
of how different courts have addressed the issue of duty, see Culhane, Clanging Silence, 
supra note 10, at 981-94. 
 108. Fernandez v. Walgreen Hastings Co., 968 P.2d 774 (N.M. 1998). 
 109. Lozoya v. Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948, 957 (N.M. 2003). 
 110. Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Ct. App. 1987) (denying recovery); see 
Culhane, Clanging Silence, supra note 10, at 963-66, for an in-depth analysis of the case. 
 111. DOBBS, supra note 2, at 843 (stating that tort’s “modest economic component” may 
explain its almost universal acceptance today). 
Deleted: PP1
Deleted: 3/19/2005
Deleted: 1:02 PM
278874-TEXT.NATIVE.1325881553.DOC 1/6/2012  12:26:42 PM 
2005] EVEN MORE WRONGFUL DEATH  125 
 
such claim that succeeds will both advance the cause of gay equality and 
possibly spur rethinking of the clearly outmoded wrongful death laws. 
CONCLUSION 
As currently constructed, most wrongful death laws fail in their essential 
purpose: to ensure that survivors are provided the economic support that 
was removed by the negligently caused death of their loved one.  With 
varying degrees of comprehensiveness, several statutes and recent 
decisions have begun to recognize that drastic overhaul of these laws is 
long overdue.  The best practice would be to grant standing to anyone who 
can make a preliminary showing of actual loss.  At minimum, rigid status-
based classifications tied to the law of intestacy should be removed and 
replaced with the decedent’s wishes as expressed through a will. 
Such changes might be inspired by recent developments in the law 
relating to loss of consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress.  
A few courts have cast off from the moorings of status and focused on 
actual loss.  The tide created by this movement could lift same-sex couples 
towards a broader legal recognition of their lives of committed intimacy. 
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